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Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity »
Authors: Thomas Metzinger
ISBN-13: 9780262134170, ISBN-10: 0262134179
Format: Hardcover
Publisher: MIT Press
Date Published: February 2003
Edition: (Non-applicable)
Author Biography: Thomas Metzinger
Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany. He is the editor of Neural Correlates of Consciousness (MIT Press, 2000).
Book Synopsis
A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective.
Table of Contents
| Acknowledgments | ||
| 1 | Questions | 1 |
| 1.1 | Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective | 1 |
| 1.2 | Questions | 6 |
| 1.3 | Overview: The architecture of the book | 9 |
| 2 | Tools I | 13 |
| 2.1 | Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states | 13 |
| 2.2 | From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience | 15 |
| 2.3 | From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning | 43 |
| 2.4 | From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia | 62 |
| 2.5 | Phenomenal presentation | 94 |
| 3 | The Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience | 107 |
| 3.1 | What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? | 107 |
| 3.2 | Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation? | 116 |
| 3.3 | Phenomenal mental models | 208 |
| 4 | Neurophenomenological Case Studies I | 213 |
| 4.1 | Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality | 213 |
| 4.2 | Deviant phenomenal models of reality | 215 |
| 4.3 | The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality | 264 |
| 5 | Tools II | 265 |
| 5.1 | Overview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness | 265 |
| 5.2 | From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality | 265 |
| 5.3 | From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves | 279 |
| 5.4 | From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy | 285 |
| 6 | The Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective | 299 |
| 6.1 | What is a phenomenal self-model? | 299 |
| 6.2 | Multilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self? | 305 |
| 6.3 | Descriptive levels of the human self-model | 353 |
| 6.4 | Levels of content within the human self-model | 379 |
| 6.5 | Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation | 411 |
| 6.6 | The self-model theory of subjectivity | 427 |
| 7 | Neurophenomenological Case Studies II | 429 |
| 7.1 | Impossible egos | 429 |
| 7.2 | Deviant phenomenal models of the self | 429 |
| 7.3 | The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective | 545 |
| 8 | Preliminary Answers | 547 |
| 8.1 | The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness | 547 |
| 8.2 | Preliminary answers | 558 |
| 8.3 | Being no one | 625 |
| References | 635 | |
| Name Index | 663 | |
| Subject Index | 671 |
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