This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly »

Carmen M. Reinhart is professor of economics at the University of Maryland. She recently coedited "The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century" and is a regular lecturer at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Kenneth S. Rogoff is the Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy and professor of economics at Harvard University. He is the coauthor of "Foundations of International Macroeconomics", and a frequent commentator for NPR, the "Wall Street Journal", and the "Financial Times".

"This is quite simply the best empirical investigation of financial crises ever published. Covering hundreds of years and bringing together a dizzying array of data, Reinhart and Rogoff have made a truly heroic contribution to financial history. This single marvelous volume is worth a thousand mathematical models."--Niall Ferguson, author of The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World

"This Time is Different is terrific, for it gives just the perspective we need on the current world economic crisis. People can't expect to understand the current crisis without some in-depth look at past crises. That is exactly what this excellent and timely book provides."--Robert J. Shiller, author of Irrational Exuberance and coauthor of Animal Spirits

"You will be hard-pressed to find a more comprehensive and insightful analysis of financial crises. Reinhart and Rogoff's superb book is a must-read for anyone looking to understand past and present crises, as well as navigate those of tomorrow."--Mohamed El-Erian, author of When Markets Collide

"This Time Is Different is a tremendously exciting, topical, and controversial book on the history of debt and default. This one belongs on everyone's shelf."--Barry Eichengreen, author of The European Economy since 1945

The Washington Post - Greg Ip

The research that went into this book has established Reinhart and Rogoff as leading authorities on crises, routinely cited by policymakers, academics and journalists (including me). Everyone working on economic policy should own This Time is Different and open it for a bracing blast of sobriety when things seem to be going well.

LIST OF TABLES xiii LIST OF FIGURES xvii LIST OF BOXES xxiii PREFACE xxv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxxvii PREAMBLE: SOME INITIAL INTUITIONS ON FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND THE FICKLE NATURE OF CONFIDENCE xxxix

PART I: Financial Crises: An Operational Primer 1
Chapter 1: Varieties of Crises and Their Dates 3
Crises Defined by Quantitative Thresholds: Inflation, Currency Crashes, and Debasement 4
Crises Defined by Events: Banking Crises and External and Domestic Default 8
Other Key Concepts 14
Chapter 2: Debt Intolerance: The Genesis of Serial Default 21
Debt Thresholds 21
Measuring Vulnerability 25
Clubs and Regions 27
Reflections on Debt Intolerance 29
Chapter 3: A Global Database on Financial Crises with a Long-Term View 34
Prices, Exchange Rates, Currency Debasement, and Real GDP 35
Government Finances and National Accounts 39
Public Debt and Its Composition 40
Global Variables 43
Country Coverage 43

PART II: Sovereign External Debt Crises 49
Chapter 4: A Digression on the Theoretical Underpinnings of Debt Crises 51
Sovereign Lending 54
Illiquidity versus Insolvency 59
Partial Default and Rescheduling 61
Odious Debt 63
Domestic Public Debt 64
Conclusions 67
Chapter 5: Cycles of Sovereign Default on External Debt 68
Recurring Patterns 68
Default and Banking Crises 73
Default and Inflation 75
Global Factors and Cycles of Global External Default 77
The Duration of Default Episodes 81
Chapter 6: External Default through History 86
The Early History of Serial Default: Emerging Europe, 1300-1799 86
Capital Inflows and Default: An "Old World" Story 89
External Sovereign Default after 1800: A Global Picture 89

PART III: The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt and Default 101
Chapter 7: The Stylized Facts of Domestic Debt and Default 103
Domestic and External Debt 103
Maturity, Rates of Return, and Currency Composition 105
Episodes of Domestic Default 110
Some Caveats Regarding Domestic Debt 111
Chapter 8: Domestic Debt: The Missing Link Explaining External Default and High Inflation 119
Understanding the Debt Intolerance Puzzle 119
Domestic Debt on the Eve and in the Aftermath of External Default 123
The Literature on Inflation and the "Inflation Tax" 124
Defining the Tax Base: Domestic Debt or the Monetary Base? 125
The "Temptation to Inflate" Revisited 127
Chapter 9: Domestic and External Default: Which Is Worse? Who Is Senior? 128
Real GDP in the Run-up to and the Aftermath of Debt Defaults 129
Inflation in the Run-up to and the Aftermath of Debt Defaults 129
The Incidence of Default on Debts Owed to External and Domestic Creditors 133
Summary and Discussion of Selected Issues 136

PART IV: Banking Crises, Inflation, and Currency Crashes 139
Chapter 10: Banking Crises 141
A Preamble on the Theory of Banking Crises 143
Banking Crises: An Equal-Opportunity Menace 147
Banking Crises, Capital Mobility, and Financial Liberalization 155
Capital Flow Bonanzas, Credit Cycles, and Asset Prices 157
Overcapacity Bubbles in the Financial Industry? 162
The Fiscal Legacy of Financial Crises Revisited 162
Living with the Wreckage: Some Observations 171
Chapter 11: Default through Debasement: An "Old World Favorite" 174
Chapter 12: Inflation and Modern Currency Crashes 180
An Early History of Inflation Crises 181
Modern Inflation Crises: Regional Comparisons 182
Currency Crashes 189
The Aftermath of High Inflation and Currency Collapses 191
Undoing Domestic Dollarization 193

PART V: The U.S. Subprime Meltdown and the Second Great Contraction 199
Chapter 13: The U.S. Subprime Crisis: An International and Historical Comparison 203
A Global Historical View of the Subprime Crisis and Its Aftermath 204
The This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome and the Run-up to the Subprime Crisis 208
Risks Posed by Sustained U.S. Borrowing from the Rest of the World: The Debate before the Crisis 208
The Episodes of Postwar Bank-Centered Financial Crisis 215
A Comparison of the Subprime Crisis with Past Crises in Advanced Economies 216
Summary 221
Chapter 14: The Aftermath of Financial Crises 223
Historical Episodes Revisited 225
The Downturn after a Crisis: Depth and Duration 226
The Fiscal Legacy of Crises 231
Sovereign Risk 232
Comparisons with Experiences from the First Great Contraction in the 1930s 233
Concluding Remarks 238
Chapter 15: The International Dimensions of the Subprime Crisis:
The Results of Contagion or Common Fundamentals? 240
Concepts of Contagion 241
Selected Earlier Episodes 241
Common Fundamentals and the Second Great Contraction 242
Are More Spillovers Under Way? 246
Chapter 16: Composite Measures of Financial Turmoil 248
Developing a Composite Index of Crises: The BCDI Index 249
Defining a Global Financial Crisis 260
The Sequencing of Crises: A Prototype 270
Summary 273

PART VI: What Have We Learned? 275
Chapter 17: Reflections on Early Warnings, Graduation, Policy Responses, and the Foibles of Human Nature 277
On Early Warnings of Crises 278
The Role of International Institutions 281
Graduation 283
Some Observations on Policy Responses 287
The Latest Version of the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome 290

DATA APPENDIXES 293
A.1. Macroeconomic Time Series 295
A.2. Public Debt 327
A.3. Dates of Banking Crises 344
A.4. Historical Summaries of Banking Crises 348
NOTES 393
REFERENCES 409
NAME INDEX 435
SUBJECT INDEX 443