Social Foraging Theory: »

Although there is extensive literature in the field of behavioral ecology that attempts to explain foraging of individuals, social foraging--the ways in which animals search and compete for food in groups--has been relatively neglected. This book redresses that situation by providing both a synthesis of the existing literature and a new theory of social foraging. Giraldeau and Caraco develop models informed by game theory that offer a new framework for analysis. Social Foraging Theory contains the most comprehensive theoretical approach to its subject, coupled with quantitative methods that will underpin future work in the field. The new models and approaches that are outlined here will encourage new research directions and applications.To date, the analysis of social foraging has lacked unifying themes, clear recognition of the problems inherent in the study of social foraging, and consistent interaction between theory and experiments. This book identifies social foraging as an economic interaction between the actions of individuals and those of other foragers. This interdependence raises complex questions about the size of foraging groups, the diversity of resources used, and the propensity of group members to exploit each other or forage cooperatively. The models developed in the book will allow researchers to test their own approaches and predictions. Many years in development, Social Foraging Theory will interest researchers and graduate students in such areas as behavioral ecology, population ecology, evolutionary biology, and wildlife management.

Michael Gillingham - ISBE Newsletter

In what is certain to become a landmark publication, Luc-Alain Giraldeau and Thomas Caraco present a frame that links differing ecological questions that, to date, have rarely been related.

Preface xi Acknowledgments xv
1 Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods 3
1.1 What Is Social Foraging? 3
1.2 Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory 6
1.3 Interactions Among Social Foragers 15
1.4 Concluding Remarks 17
Math Boxes 1.1-1.3 19
PART ONE: Group Membership Games
2 Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions 35
2.1 Introduction 35
2.2 Achieving an Aggregation Economy 36
2.3 A Symmetric Group Membership Game 40
2.4 An Asymmetric Group Membership Game 43
2.5 Concluding Remarks 48
Math Box 2.1 50
3 Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation 54
3.1 Introduction 54
3.2 Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost 56
3.3 Food-Calling and Cooperation 66
3.4 Concluding Remarks 73
Math Boxes 3.1-3.3 78
4 Group Size in Aggregation Economies 85
4.1 Introduction 85
4.2 Which Group Size to Expect? 87
4.3 The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size 90
4.4 Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance 96
4.5 Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games 100
4.6 Concluding Remarks 109
Math Boxes 4.1-4.4 113
5 Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies 119
5.1 Introduction 119
5.2 Introduction to Continuous Input Models 121
5.3 Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models 123
5.4 Introduction to Interference Models
5.5 Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models 140
5.6 Concluding Remarks 146
PART TWO: Producer-Scrounger Decisions
6 An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games 151
6.1 Introduction 151
6.2 The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism 152
6.3 Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach 153
6.4 A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 155
6.5 Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model 164
6.6 Concluding Remarks 168
Math Box 6.1 170
7 Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments 174
7.1 Introduction 174
7.2 A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game 174
7.3 Analysis of the Stochastic Game 180
7.4 Numerical Evaluation 184
7.5 Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive 194
7.6 Concluding Remarks 196
Math Boxes 7.1-7.2 199
PART THREE: Decisions within Patches
8 Social Patch and Play Models 205
8.1 Introduction 205
8.2 Models of Social Patch Exploitation 206
8.3 Tests of Social Patch Models 220
8.4 Social Prey Models 222
8.5 Concluding Remarks 225
PART FOUR: Models of Phenotypic Diversity
9 Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity 229
9.1 Composition of Foraging Groups 229
9.2 Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior 232
9.3 Phenotypic Diversity 234
9.4 Concluding Remarks 246
Math Box 9.1 248
10 Learning in Foraging Groups 253
10.1 Introduction 253
10.2 Some Functional Definitions of Learning 253
10.3 Learning How: Individual Learning Only 255
10.4 Models of Individual Learning Only 257
10.5 Learning How: Social Learning 269
10.6 Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How 271
10.7 Learning About Individual Learning 277
10.8 Learning About Social Learning 277
10.9 Concluding Remarks 280
Math Boxes 10.1-10.3 282
11 Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool 287
11.1 Background 288
11.2 A Skill Pool: Static Model 289
11.3 A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model 302
11.4 Conclusions 315
Math Box 11 .1 322
PART FIVE: Final Thoughts
12 Synthesis and Conclusions 325
12.1 Introduction 325
12.2 Group Membership Models 325
12.3 Searching Decisions within Groups 330
12.4 Models for Decisions within Patches 331
12.5 Models of Phenotypic Diversity 332
12.6 Conclusions 334
References 335
Subject Index 359
Species Index 361