Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics »

One of the chief tasks facing political leaders is to build and maintain unity within their parties. Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics examines the relationship between party leaders and Members of Parliament in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, showing how the two sides interact and sometimes clash. Christopher J. Kam demonstrates how incentives for MPs to dissent from their parties have been amplified by a process of partisan dealignment that has created electorates of non-partisan voters who reward shows of political independence. Party leaders therefore rely on a mixture of strategies to offset these electoral pressures, from offering MPs advancement to threatening discipline, and ultimately replying on a long-run process of socialization to temper their MPs' dissension. Kam reveals the underlying structure of party unity in modern Westminster parliamentary politics, and drives home the point that social norms and socialization reinforce rather than displace appeals to MPs' self-interest.

List of figures vi

List of tables viii

Acknowledgements xi

1 Introduction 1

2 A model of intra-party politics 21

3 Patterns of backbench dissent in four Westminster parliamentary systems, 1945-2005 38

4 Policy preferences and backbench dissent in Great Britain and Canada 75

5 Dissent, constituency service, and the personal vote in Great Britain and New Zealand 103

6 The cost of dissent to the party 130

7 Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party, 1991-1997 150

8 Discipline and dissent in the Australian Coalition, 1996-1998 169

9 Career trajectories, socialization, and backbench dissent in the British House of Commons 189

10 Conclusion 205

Appendix 1 Comparative statics and proofs 211

Appendix 2 Content and construction of ideological scales 228

Appendix 3 Sampling and coding of media dissent and discipline 238

Appendix 4 Demotion and the parliamentary careers of Canadian MPs 243

References 248

Index 261