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Inside the Firm: The Inefficiencies of Hierarchy »

Book cover image of Inside the Firm: The Inefficiencies of Hierarchy by Harvey Leibenstein

Authors: Harvey Leibenstein
ISBN-13: 9781583485309, ISBN-10: 1583485309
Format: Paperback
Publisher: iUniverse, Incorporated
Date Published: March 2000
Edition: (Non-applicable)

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Author Biography: Harvey Leibenstein

Book Synopsis

Why are most businesses less efficient that they could be? Why do two identical Ford plants in England and Germany, manufacturing identical cars, have vastly different rates of production?

Harvey Leibenstein explores such questions in depth, using ideas and evidence from economics, game theory, psychology, and other disciplines. He observes that employees usually perform best when they work under a moderate amount of pressure - not too little and not too much. But this sort of balanced situation is rare, so most workers in low-pressure situations may shirk their tasks, while those in a stressful environment may cave in.

To avoid this state of affairs, Leibenstein argues, workers tacitly adopt conventions about proper degrees of effort. The history of the firm, the degree of hierarchy, and the nature of the competitive relationships within the firm largely govern these standards, which frequently defy rational considerations. Leibenstein analyzes the structure and functioning of companies with multiple levels of hierarchy, pinpointing sources of inefficiency. He also examines the question of entrepreneurship.

Library Journal

Leibenstein, an economist, looks at internal inefficiency in firms and what can be done about it. He ``examines how the behavior of firm members differs when firms are sheltered from the rigors of competition'' by looking at conventions about acceptable levels of effort, employment relations, and hierarchical structures that produce inefficiency. The result is a model explicated by a series of graphs. This book will probably create as much comment as his earlier Beyond Economic Man. However, without a background in economics, the reader could find the language difficult. Recommended for comprehensive business collections. Michael D. Kathman, St. John's Univ. Lib., Collegeville, Minn.

Table of Contents

1.Organization and the Procedural Perspective1
The Procedural Perspective6
The Connections of the Various Components of the Book9
2.Decision Occurrences11
The Inner Preference Set12
Decision Procedures13
Approximate Maximizing Procedures15
Are Noncalculating Procedures Optimal?16
The Yerkes-Dodson Law and Decision Procedures18
The Emotion Spillover Theory of Decision Making20
Inert Areas and Procedural Decisions22
The Employment Contract and Commitment Decisions22
Summary and Conclusions24
3.On the Anatomy of Decisions26
Decision Triggers and Finalizations26
Options, Selection Rules, and Search Processes28
Notes on Procedures and Procedure Sets32
Conclusions33
4.Economics of Inertia35
Modeling Inertial Frames37
Some Consequences of Inertia41
5.Productivity: The Hidden Prisoner's Dilemma Analysis43
Self-Interest and Trust: The Prisoner's Dilemma Example44
The Productivity Problem in the Prisoner's Dilemma Framework48
Peer Group and Golden-Rule Standards52
The Twofold Prisoner's Dilemma Problem57
Summary and Conclusions58
6.Conventions, Coordination, and Decisions60
The Theory of Conventions62
Conventions as a Formalism66
Does a Convention Have to Be Optimal?71
Summary and Conclusions75
7.Conventions as a Solution to the Intrafirm Prisoner's Dilemma Problem77
The Effort Convention79
Working Conditions and Wages86
Wages: Convention or Negotiation?91
On the Stability of Conventions95
Summary and Conclusions96
8.Intrafirm Effort Decisions: Monitoring and Sanctions98
The Voluntarily Motivated Effort Hypothesis99
Hierarchical Sanctions102
Peer Sanctions and Sanction Levels107
Sanctions and Nonmaximizing Behavior114
Concluding Remarks115
9.Equilibrium, Entrepreneurship, and Inertia116
Equilibrium and Quasi-Equilibrium117
What Do Entrepreneurs Do?118
The Supply of Entrepreneurs and n Achievement Theory120
Behavior of Firms under Loose Equilibrium121
Summary and Conclusions125
10.An Implications Sampler127
Summary of Basic Postulates129
Effort Convention Implications130
Firm-Level Implications131
11.The Power of Hierarchy135
The Power and Size of Hierarchy140
The Israeli Kibbutz: Size and Hierarchy144
The Hierarchical Solution to the Size Problem146
12.Specialization, Hierarchy, and Internal Inefficiency150
Specialization, Effort, and Motivation151
Process Cuts, Specialization, and Recombinings154
Related Invisible "Cutouts"158
Hierarchical Levels, Distance, and Separations160
Controls, Incentives, and Motivations under Hierarchies161
Motivational Interdependencies and Hierarchy164
Vertical Groups166
The Commitment Network169
Internal Entrepreneurship and the Commitment Network172
Factionalism173
Autonomous Internal Organizations174
Summary174
13.On Japanese Ethos, Culture, and Management177
Borrowing179
More on Confucianism182
The Social Anthropology Approach185
The Theory of Amae192
Summary196
14.Japanese and Western Management Systems: The Contrasts199
The Career Elements of the JMS201
Lifetime Employment Ideal203
Jobs, Training, and Unions208
The Japanese Payment and Bonus System212
Community, Authority, and Consensus213
The Industrial Group215
Summary and Conclusions216
15.Putting It All Together220
The Basic Model220
Pressure, Hierarchy, and Effort222
A Diagrammatic Treatment of the Model231
Sources of Inefficiency234
Efficiency Wages238
Some Concluding Remarks241
AppendixLanguage, Choice, and Nonoptimization245
Comparative Language Problems248
Ex Ante versus Ex Post Arguments249
The Revealed Preference Case251
On Objective Function Misspecifications252
Are Nonoptimal Choices Always Translatable?254
The Disutility of Maximization255
Inertia, Inert Areas, and Utility258
Decision Making: Individuals versus Groups261
Language and the Concept of Technical Inefficiency261
Summary262
References263
Index273

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