Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions » (New Edition)

"Peyton Young's study puts the evolution of institutions on the basis of individual choices in an adaptive and adapting environment. It puts a firm foundation under the vague idea of 'spontaneous order.' The exposition is extraordinarily clear; Young introduces and explains the mathematical tools he uses in his brilliant synthesis and development, which combines ideas from evolutionary theory and the study of learning. The book is accessible to the beginner in the field and yet no one, no matter how expert, will fail to learn something."--Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, 1972 Nobel Laureate in Economics

"Individual Strategy and Social Structure makes a convincing case for an adaptive, low-rationality, probabilistic approach to game theory and to economics and social science in general."--Alvin E. Roth, Harvard University

"In this well written and elegant volume, Peyton Young takes a large step in redirecting the theory and the problems that game theorists deal with. Rather than asking what is the proper equilibrium notion for a game played by fully rational agents capable of making all necessary calculations, he asks what types of conventions of behavior or social institutions will intelligent but not omniscient agents create for themselves when they repeatedly face the same problem that needs to be solved. Clearly this is what the real world looks like and Young brings us closer to it."--Andrew Schotter, New York University

Journal of Economics

[Individual Strategy and Social Structure] should be a valuable resource for all interested in this extremely valuable and flexible technique. Self-contained and pleasant to read.