Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU and China. The Rise of Legalization in the Trade Regime and its Consequences »

With its virtually universal treaty network and its binding dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), has the World Trade Organization (WTO) become a 'legalized' international organization? To a large extent, the positive effect of the move to a higher

List of Abbreviations

Foreword

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1

1 Introduction 1

Chapter 2 Conceptualizing Legalization in the WTO System 7

1 Introduction 7

2 Defining Legalization in International Relations 10

2.1 Elements of Legalization 10

2.2 The Uneven Expansion of Legalization 13

2.3 Consequences of Legalization 17

2.4 A Richer View of Legalization? 17

3 Applying Legalization in the WTO System 18

3.1 Elements of Legalization in the WTO 18

3.2 Uneven Expansion of Legalization in the WTO 21

3.3 Consequences of Legalization in the WTO 25

3.3.1 'Legalizing' National Trade Policy in the GATT/WTO System 25

3.3.2 Building up Capacity to Utilize the DSM 27

3.4 Conclusion 30

Chapter 3 Rise of Legalization in the Multilateral Framework 31

1 Introduction 31

2 Rise of Legalization in the Multilateal Framework 32

2.1 From Politics to 'Diplomat's Jurisprudence': The Evaluation of the GATT 32

2.1.1 Elements of Legalization in the GATT 32

2.1.1.1 Decision-making 33

2.1.1.2 Surveillance 34

2.1.1.3 Adjudication 35

2.1.2 Uneven Expansion of Legalization in the GATT 36

2.2 A New Hope of Legalization: The Establishment of the WTO 38

2.2.1 Decision-making 38

2.2.2 Surveillance 39

2.2.3 Adjudication 41

3 Theoretical Debates Related to Judicialization 42

3.1 The Role of the DSM 43

3.2 Standard of Review 46

3.3 Remedies and Compliance in the DSM 48

4 Conclusion 50

Chapter 4 Legalization of Anti-dumping Rules at the International Level 53

1 Introduction 53

2 Phenomenon of Dumping and the Development of AD Laws 54

3 'Legalizing' AD Rules at the International Level 59

3.1 Trade Negotiations and International AD Rules 59

3.1.1 AD Negotiations in Pre-Uruguay Trade Rounds 59

3.1.1.1 GATT Article VI 60

3.1.1.2 GATT Report of Group of Experts (1961) 62

3.1.1.3 The Anti-dumping Code of Kennedy Round (the 1968 Code) 65

3.1.1.4 The Anti-dumping Code of Tokyo Round (the 1979 Code) 66

3.1.2 The Uruguay Round and the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement (ADA) 69

3.1.2.1 Legal Status of the ADA 70

3.1.2.2.1 An Overview 70

3.1.2.2.2 Obligation 73

3.1.2.2.3 Precision 77

3.1.2.2.4 Delegation 81

3.1.3 Anti-dumping in the Doha Round 84

3.2 Surveillance Mechanism and the AD Rules 88

3.3 Anti-dumping in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 90

4 The Uneven Expansion of Legalization in the AD Regime 95

4.1 The Uneven Expansion of Obligation 95

4.2 The Uneven Expansion of Precision 100

4.3 The Uneven Expansion of Delegation 101

5 Conclusion 103

Chapter 5 WTO-transposed and WTO-plus Features of the EU AD Regime 105

1 Introduction 105

2 WTO-Transposed Features of the EU Anti-Dumping Regime 107

2.1 Evolution of Community AD Instruments 107

2.1.1 Pre-ADA Community AD Instruments 107

2.1.2 An Overview of Regulation 384/96 (the Basic Regulation) 111

2.2 Administration of Community AD Rules 116

2.2.1 The Commission and the Administration of AD Proceedings 116

2.2.2 Control of Administration within the EU 119

2.3 Judicial Review of Community AD Policy 122

3 WTO-Plus Features of the EU Anti-Dumping Regime 127

3.1 Injury Margin 127

3.1.1 Lesser Duty Rule in the WTO 127

3.1.2 Injury Margin Calculation in the EU 130

3.2 Community Interest 134

3.2.1 Public Interest in WTO Law 134

3.2.2 Community Interest Test in the EU Law 135

3.2.2.1 Procedural Aspects of the Community Interest Test 136

3.2.2.2 Substantive Assessment of the Community Interest 137

3.2.2.3 Reflections on Green Paper 140

3.3 Anti-circumvention 143

3.3.1 Anti-circumvention in the WTO 143

3.3.2 Anti-circumvention in the EU Anti-dumping Law 144

3.3.2.1 Change in the Pattern of Trade 146

3.3.2.2 Practice, Process or Work 147

3.3.2.3 Insufficient Due Cause or Economic Justification 147

3.3.2.4 Remedial Effects of the Duty 148

3.3.2.5 Like Product 148

3.3.2.6 The 60% Value of Parts Test and the 25% Value-added Test 149

4 Conclusion 150