Authors: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole
ISBN-13: 9780262121743, ISBN-10: 0262121743
Format: Hardcover
Publisher: MIT Press
Date Published: March 1993
Edition: 1st Edition
Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at the Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and the Institut Universitaire de France and Director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle.
Jean Tirole is Scientific Director at the Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Researcher at CERAS (of the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées), and Visiting Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.
Foreword | ||
Acknowledgments | ||
Introduction | 1 | |
I | Price and Rate-Of-Return Regulation | |
1 | Cost-Reimbursement Rules | 53 |
2 | Pricing by a Single-Product Firm With and Without Budget Balance | 129 |
3 | Pricing and Incentives in a Multiproduct Firm | 165 |
4 | Regulation of Quality | 211 |
II | Product Market Competition | |
5 | Competitive Ramsey Formulas and Access Pricing | 247 |
6 | Bypass and Cream Skimming | 273 |
III | Bidding for Natural Monopoly | |
7 | Auctioning Incentive Contracts | 307 |
8 | Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity | 341 |
IV | The Dynamics of Regulation | |
9 | Dynamics Without Commitment and the Ratchet Effect | 375 |
10 | Commitment and Renegotiation | 437 |
V | The Politics of Regulation | |
11 | Regulatory Capture | 475 |
12 | Cost Padding, Auditing, and Collusion | 515 |
13 | Cartelization by Regulation | 537 |
14 | Auction Design and Favoritism | 559 |
VI | Regulatory Institutions | |
15 | Regulatory Instruments, Hearings, and Interest Group Monitoring | 591 |
16 | Commitment and Political Accountability | 619 |
17 | Privatization and Incentives | 637 |
Conclusion | 661 | |
Review Exercises | 671 | |
Index | 695 |