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In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan Audio CD – Unabridged, August 16, 2010
Purchase options and add-ons
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherBlackstone Audiobooks
- Publication dateAugust 16, 2010
- Dimensions5.2 x 1.5 x 5.7 inches
- ISBN-101441769757
- ISBN-13978-1441769756
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Editorial Reviews
About the Author
Seth G. Jones serves as an adviser and plans officer for the commanding general of US Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. He lives outside Washington, DC, and contributes regularly to the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He was named one of 2008's "Best and Brightest" young policy experts by Esquire.
William Hughes is an AudioFile Earphones Award-winning narrator. A professor of political science at Southern Oregon University in Ashland, Oregon, he received his doctorate in American politics from the University of California at Davis. He has done voice-over work for radio and film and is also an accomplished jazz guitarist.
Product details
- Publisher : Blackstone Audiobooks; Unabridged edition (August 16, 2010)
- Language : English
- ISBN-10 : 1441769757
- ISBN-13 : 978-1441769756
- Item Weight : 10.6 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.2 x 1.5 x 5.7 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #10,256,270 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #2,017 in Afghan War Military History
- #12,718 in National & International Security (Books)
- #56,709 in American Military History
- Customer Reviews:
About the author
Seth G. Jones is a senior vice president, Harold Brown Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He teaches at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Prior to joining CSIS, Dr. Jones was the director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation. Previously, he served as representative for the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to the assistant secretary of defense for special operations. He was also a plans officer and adviser to the commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan (Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan). Dr. Jones is a graduate of Bowdoin College and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.
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Walk into a Borders or a Barnes and Noble book store and you will find an overwhelming display of books claiming to be about the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, but it is rare to find a book without any partisan or political vitriol clouding its body. If you're looking for an honest, no-nonsense approach to studying Afghanistan without unnecessary drivel, "In the Graveyard of Empires" is your book.
Essentially organized in chronological order, Jones begins by identifying why Afghanistan has earned its reputation as a "graveyard of empires." According to Jones, the region has been invaded by a multitude of great powers (Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Britain, and the USSR), only to be repelled... often with devastating effectiveness. Jones links much of this phenomenon to the warrior spirit of native Afghans, the mountainous terrain, and much more.
The remainder of the book identifies and explains the logic, decision making, errors in judgement, accomplishments, setbacks, and policy changes that have occurred since the war began in 2001 through the present. While the book is largely free of the author's opinion, he does argue the following major points while providing supporting evidence:
*The "light footprint" strategy inti tally enacted by the United States was a grievous error
*The War in Iraq was a huge setback for our progress in Afghanistan causing a severe lack of troops, funding, and leadership
*Pakistan, our ally, has become the new breeding ground for al-Qaida and the Taliban and we need to do a better job of "encouraging" Pakistan to put a stop to it
*Instead of a top-down strategy for nation building, we should use the bottom-up method due to the tribal nature of most Afghans
Overall, "In the Graveyard of Empires" is a well-written, well thought out, and well-researched book about how we got to where we are in Afghanistan and our prospects for the future. Unlike many authors, Seth G. Jones can actually draw upon personal experience having spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan conducting research for this book.
The personal touch offered by Jones allows the reader to "humanize" some of the problems in Afghanistan. I especially appreciated how Jones chose to include many of the good things we've accomplished in Afghanistan rather than writing a book which only included gloom and doom.
About the Author:
"Seth G. Jones most recently served as an advisor and plans officer for the Commanding General, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan. A political scientist at RAND, he contributes regularly to the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He lives outside of Washington DC." (From the back cover)
During the Zahir Shah monarchy (1963-1973), an "era of modernity and democratic freedom," Jones says that the weak central government was able to achieve stability through power sharing arrangements with local entities. Eventually, corruption, slow economic progress, and Shah's remote style of governance undermined his government, and coups in 1973 and 1978 led to rule by a revolutionary council that established a new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The council was split between a faction that wanted to install a Soviet-style communist regime and a competing faction that wanted to move more gradually toward socialism. Both of these factions were violently opposed in rural areas by Islamists.
Fearing that the United States and Pakistan would take advantage of the disorder to increase their influence in Afghanistan, the Soviets began their occupation of the country in December 1979. In response, Jones, says, the CIA began a modest program of assistance to mujahideen forces that grew to reach $4 billion to $5 billion dollars between 1980 and 1992. Saudi Arabia provided similar sums, and additional contributions came from Islamic foundations.
The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the U.S. embassy closed the same year - not to open again until 2001. Jones cites a State Department cable as saying that "the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989 and fall of the communist regime in April 1992, set the stage for a more or less open competition for influence in Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran." India joined Iran in providing support to the Rabbani government and Ahmed Shah Massoud's Jamiat-e-Islami in Northern Afghanistan, while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia supported Pashtun forces.
In 1994, the Taliban movement emerged in Southern Afghanistan, seeking to cleanse the country of conflict and purify its religious and social institutions. Ironically, the Taliban movement drew important financial strength from opium poppy cultivation, which it considered permissible because opium was consumed by Westerners. Another key source of financial support was Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which had also been active in supporting mujahideen forces during the Soviet occupation.
Osama bin Laden went to Afghanistan when he was expelled from Sudan in 1996. According to Jones, "the Taliban entrusted to Osama bin Laden control of most non-Pakistani and non-Afghan militant groups" in Afghanistan. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Government used special forces to support the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, which collapsed almost immediately. The interim administration led by Hamid Karzai, took office in December 2001.
Despite the impressive victory over the Taliban, large numbers of fighters escaped into Pakistan, and the Taliban continued to launch attacks from Pakistan. Still, levels of violence in Afghanistan were relatively low, important progress was made in basic education, and in 2005, 83 percent of Afghans rated President Karzai's performance as excellent or good.
At this time, the low-level insurgency against the Karzai government was gathering strength. According to Jones, Karzai's government was perceived to be corrupt, and people began to lose confidence in the ability of the government to improve living standards. The religious ideologues directing the insurgency needed
a supply of disgruntled young men, and weak governance produced them. A key failure of the government and its supporters was the inability to field a capable, credible police force to reasonably ensure public security. As the insurgency built momentum, Jones says, a lack of sufficient support from the United States and NATO for the government, and more effective support from outside groups for the insurgents, also contributed to the strength of the insurgency.
To stabilize Afghanistan and suppress the insurgency, Jones says that it is critical to take on corruption, develop partnerships with local entities as well as the central government, and eliminate insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Jones disciplines his narrative with a rigorous analytical framework, and the book benefits from his access to senior U.S. Government officials. His material is adequately sourced, although some of the most surprising and interesting statements in the book are sourced anonymously. There are good maps and a useful chronology. The index is adequate but it is not as complete as it could be: for example, it omits "corruption," "nation building," and "police training," all of which are integral to Jones' explanation of how the insurgency found its legs after 2005.
Top reviews from other countries
This book should be read in conjunction with "Descent into Chaos" by Ahmed Rashid for a fuller picture of the failures in Afghanistan.
On the bright side the book does include some of the major events of the current US led mission in Afghanistan. So in essence, had you not followed the conflict, this saves you from going through a pile of newspaper articles to get up to speed. In addition Jones did have access to lots of not widely publically available sources and there is the occasional useful piece of information included.
Unfortunately that is about as far as the good aspects of the book go. The first serious issue is a grave lack of understanding of the historical background on the author's part - even books such as Feifer's The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan , which follow first hand accounts of the war there and are not supposed to provide analysis beyond that do a vastly better job of portraying the background. Jones on several occasions even praises Elphinstone (the British commander in the first Anglo-Afghan war) as an experienced statesman and soldier - what next, the Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade being the most brilliant military maneuvre? Even the Russian invasion, which in many ways is a very relevant field to analyse in light of the current conflict, is handled so superficially (with many mistaken conclusions drawn) as to elicit a groan from anyone who has even a basic understanding - it appears the author took the approach of 'history starts now'.
When it comes to the current conflict, the situation sadly does not improve. There is plenty of citing of various sources but no analysis. Like a poor Master's thesis it is a list of what various people said on a given subject, without attempting to compare the sources, build a list of proper hypotheses and testing them. This would not be strictly necessary, had the author not promised a serious analysis and confirming a theory of his upfront. Conflicting data is not put into context, the approach is never critical - basically it is a collection of excerpts of interview transcripts, making sure never to contradict what the interviewees say.
On top of that the author fails to differentiate between the essential and important aspects, and those which are relatively trivial. This makes the book a very hardgoing read - it seems that for every sentence of the story there is almost a paragraph of unnecessary explanation. I know that the author is trying to draw in the reader but in my opinion he fails badly. One finds out more about which baseball team the majority of protagonists support and why than about how most military operations went - these seem to be classified as successful just because they happened or because someone participated, irrespective of the objectives achieved.
Not having read any of the author's other books I cannot say if this is a rare departure from form, or par for the course but you can do much better, when trying to understand the conflict in Afghanistan than this book. In terms of decision making issues and problems, Dixon's On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (Pimlico) and Janis' Group Think are a good start; specifically for Afghanistan Feifer's The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan will give a better view both of the Russian and subsequent American decision making processes and failures. In terms of more specific military operations, something like The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Soviet (Russian) Study of War) will be very good. Even populist journalists like Sholl-Latour ( Weltmacht im Treibsand: Bush gegen die Ayatollahs ) seem to do a better job than Jones has in this book.